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Information Asymmetry Around S&P 500 Index Changes  
Youna Hong 
 
We examine the effects of S&P 500 index composition changes on the trading 
environment from 2001 to 2010. We find that the adverse selection cost of trading 
significantly decreases post addition and increases post deletion. However, the intraday 
price dynamics of additions to the index seem to be distinct from those of deletions from 
the index. The event period cumulative abnormal returns for additions are significantly 
associated with the change in the adverse selection cost of trading while this association 
is non-significant for deletions. However, the cumulative abnormal returns for deletion 
event periods are found to be significantly associated with the change in realized spreads. 
Realized spreads may be interpreted as a measure of revenue earned by the liquidity 
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Extant researches have documented that companies added to the S&P 500 index 
exhibit price increases on average, while those deleted from the index experience price 
decreases. Several explanations that attempt to explain these effects may be classified 
into two categories based primarily on the premise of informational effect. The 
hypotheses that assume no informational changes – transitory price pressure (Harris and 
Gurel, 1986; Erwin and Miller, 1998), and long-term downward-sloping demand curves 
for stocks (Shleifer, 1986; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002) – and the hypotheses that 
address changes in information – on operating performance (Denis, McConnell, 
Ovtchinnikov, and Yu, 2003), earnings quality and disclosures (Platikanova, 2008), 
sustained liquidity effect (Beneish and Whaley, 1996; Hegde and McDermott, 2003) and  
investor awareness (Chen, Noronha, and Singal, 2004).  
This study explores information asymmetry (as measured by the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread) around S&P 500 revisions. Intuitively, improved 
disclosure and transparency post addition can either enable uninformed investors to 
“catch up” to informed investors (thereby reduced inter-investor information asymmetry), 
or benefit informed investors to gain a greater advantage through their superior 
processing of the increased information (thereby increased inter-investor information 
asymmetry). Hegde and McDermott (2003) find evidence of reduced information 





 Will the deletion results change with larger sample? To what extent are the 
changes in information asymmetry associated with the price formation around index 
changes? These are empirical questions with important implications. First, an answer will 
give us a better understanding of how information is incorporated into security prices in 
the market and what impact the changes in informational environment has on the trading 
environment. Second, it could enhance our understanding of the price effects of addition 
to and deletion from indices.  
The sample period for this study ranges from 2001 to 2010. Consistent with the 
findings of Hegde and McDermott (2003), we find that quoted spreads and relative 
spreads decrease (increase) over the three months following addition (deletion). Thus we 
find evidence of a significant long-term improvement in liquidity post addition and 
significant long-term deterioration in liquidity post deletion.  
We also find a significant decline in the adverse selection cost post addition and a 
corresponding increase in the realized spread. Realized spreads may be interpreted as 
non-informational component of the price impact. The presence of informed traders will 
cause market prices on average to rise after buyer-initiated trades and, similarly, fall after 
seller-initiated trades. Due to these adverse price changes, liquidity providers, in general, 
earn less than the effective spread, and the realized spread is a measure of their revenue 
net of losses to better-informed traders. For our sample, the changes in effective spreads 
following addition are found to be statistically zero in the [-60, +60] window. This 
implies that increased firm transparency (Platikanova, 2008) post addition, in turn, may 
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lead to lower risk of adverse selection in the trading environment.
2
 However, a large 
portion of the benefits from this change seem to be getting captured by liquidity 
suppliers, resulting in effective spreads remaining unchanged. We find this result 
somewhat surprising, since we expect that the instrument of post-addition improved 
liquidity to be competition among liquidity providers.
3
   
Conversely, we find that the adverse selection cost of trading significantly 
increases over the three months post deletion. One possible reason for this change is 
perhaps the exit of index funds that, in turn, reduces non-informational trading. It can 
also be potentially related to a decline in the number of analysts covering the firm (Zhou, 
2011) that leads to a lower amount of firm-specific information (thereby increased firm-
to-investor information asymmetry).  
Surprisingly, the realized spreads post deletion appear to decline significantly, 
resulting in narrower effective spreads, inconsistent with the increase in quoted and 
relative spreads. Quoted spreads are the difference between the bid and ask quotes and 
measure market and order flow conditions at the time of order arrival, whereas effective 
spreads consider trades that are executed inside the quotes, therefore, more reliably 
measuring the true cost of trading.
4
 One possible explanation for the lower effective 
spreads is a greater level of competition among liquidity suppliers. Given the increase in 
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 Platikanova (2008) finds that discretionary accruals significantly decrease after additions, potentially 
improving earnings quality.  
3
 Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) find increased realized spreads for large-cap stocks under 
algorithmic trading environment, but no significant effects for small-cap stocks. To the extent that the 
trading in our sample period is influenced by algorithmic trading, it may be at least partially explained by 
this mechanism. 
4
 Effective spreads measure how much above the midpoint price one pays on a buy order and how much 
below the midpoint price one receives on a sell order. Thus, effective spreads capture the magnitude of 
price improvement.  
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asymmetric information post deletion, it might be explained by the models that present an 
inverse relation between liquidity supply and informed order flow.
5
 
Furthermore, we present evidence that abnormal returns following addition are 
positively associated with changes in adverse selection costs. This suggests that ceteris 
paribus, improvements in liquidity post addition, caused by a decline in adverse 
selection, should be associated with lower cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). However, 
to the extent that the post-addition CAR is positive, other factors than informed trading 
alone should affect the results. Various reasons for increased post-addition CAR have 
been suggested including a demand shock from indexers (Blouin, Raedy, and 
Shackelford, 2000), arbitrage risk (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002), a change in 
expected cash flows (Denis et al., 2003), an improvement in liquidity (Hegde and 
McDermott, 2003). 
In addition, we find that post-deletion abnormal returns are significantly 
negatively associated with changes in realized spreads in the immediate window. These 
findings may imply that post-addition returns are associated with a sustained asymmetric 
information effect, whereas post-deletion returns are associated with a transitory liquidity 
effect. Presently, we do not have a compelling explanation for this pattern. These results 
may at least be considered as additional evidence supporting asymmetric effects between 
additions and deletions, consistent with Chen et al. (2004). 
Finally, the results of our analysis suggest that a decrease in firm-to-investor 
information asymmetry post addition (Platikanova, 2008) is associated with a decrease in 
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 Huang and Stoll (1996) and DeJong et al. (1996) find a negative correlation of realized spread and 
adverse selection costs. 
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inter-investor information asymmetry. Similarly, an increase in post deletion firm-to-
investor information asymmetry (Zhou, 2011) is associated with an increased inter-
investor information asymmetry. This finding supports the catching-up hypothesis 
presented above, whereby, improved disclosure post addition enables the uninformed 
investors to catch up to the better-informed investors, leading to lower adverse selection 
risk. On the contrary, Huson and McKinnon (2003) find that reduction in firm-to-investor 
information asymmetry post focus-enhancing spinoff, leads to greater adverse selection 
risk in the market. In their study, an increase in the firm-to-investor information 
asymmetry creates an even more favorable environment for superiorly informed 
investors, thereby exacerbating adverse selection problem.  
These seemingly contradictory results suggest that the relationship between firm-
to-investor information asymmetry and inter-investor information asymmetry cannot be 
monotonic. In an attempt to explain the contradiction, Ravi and Hong (2012) propose a 
unimodal relation between the two types of information asymmetry. They find that the 
inter-investor information asymmetry increases, and then declines, as the firm-to-investor 
information asymmetry decreases from absolutely opaque situations to perfectly 
transparent situations.  
We conjecture that spinoff firms are likely to be relatively opaque prior to spinoff 
and therefore, decreased opacity may lead to increased adverse selection. In contrast, 
additions to the S&P 500 are likely to be relatively large and stable firms, with greater 
transparency. Therefore, these firms are probably positioned on the decreasing 
information asymmetry side of the opacity and information asymmetry dimension, where 
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marginal gain of information acquisition is smaller than marginal cost of being 
uninformed, thereby, resulting in lower information asymmetry between investors.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes related 
literature. Section 3 describes our sample construction and research methods. Section 4 
reports and discuss main results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. On Index Changes 
 
Here, we provide background information of key literatures on the index changes. 
Shleifer (1986) and Harris and Gurel (1986) are one of the earliest works on the S&P 500 
index changes, followed by Jain (1987). Their main hypotheses on the price effects of 
revisions to the S&P 500 index may be categorized as the downward sloping demand 
curve hypothesis, the price pressure hypothesis, and the information hypothesis. More 
recently, the investor recognition hypothesis has been proposed.
6
 
At the onset, the price pattern around index changes garnered attention as 
potential evidence refuting market efficiency. The imperfect substitute hypothesis 
associates permanent price effects with downward sloping demand curves for stocks due 
to difficulty of finding perfect substitutes and, therefore, a limit-to-arbitrage case (Lynch 
and Mendenhall, 1997; Shleifer, 1986; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002).
7
 In comparison, 
the price pressure hypothesis addresses transitory price effects accompanied by 
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 Many previous works provide a detailed survey of existing hypotheses. See, for instance, Chen et al. 
(2004), Elliott et al. (2006), Hegde and McDermott (2003) and Kappou et al. (2008). 
7
 In Shleifer’s study, ten days after the index change is regarded as permanent.  
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temporary order imbalances among various index replicators (Harris and Gurel, 1986; 
Elliott and Warr, 2003). Broadly speaking, the imperfect substitute hypothesis and the 
price pressure hypothesis can be classified together as the long-term and short-term 
downward sloping demand curves, differing mostly on the duration of the effect. For 
instance, Pruitt and Wei (1989) find that changes in institutional ownership are positively 
correlated to the changes in the S&P 500, augmenting both Shleifer (1986) and Harris 
and Gurel (1986). 
In contrast with the information-free premise of these two hypotheses, the 
information hypothesis argues that the permanent price effects are caused by the 
incorporation of unexpected information on the future performance of the respective 
companies. Various evidences consistent with this line of research have been proposed 
including price increases of the supplementary index additions that are unrelated to index 
fund rebalancing (Jain, 1987), concurrent price changes of stocks, bonds, and options of 
the index inclusions and exclusions (Dhillon and Johnson, 1991), significant changes in 
earnings forecasts and realized earnings post-index changes (Denis, McConnell, 
Ovtchinnikov, and Yu, 2003), spillover effects on the companies in the same industry as 
the additions (Cai, 2007; Gygax and Otchere, 2010) and changes in earnings quality post 
additions (Platikanova, 2008). Furthermore, the permanent price impact may be driven by 
the permanent changes in direct trading costs, suggested by the liquidity-wealth 
hypothesis (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986).  
Although the above hypotheses expect differences in continuation of the price 
effects, they all expect symmetric changes for additions and deletions. On the contrary, 
the investor recognition hypothesis attempts to explain asymmetric changes in prices – 
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permanent price increases for additions but temporary price decreases for deletions 
(Chen, Noronha, and Singal, 2004) using Merton’s (1987) shadow cost. The shadow cost 
measure is pioneered by Kadlec and McConnell (1994) which finds that investor 
recognition plays an important role on the returns of the new listings on NYSE. As a 
further extension, Zhou (2011) documents differences in the price effects of subgroups 
across additions and deletions: first-time additions to the S&P 500 index family exhibit 
greater changes in investor recognition and permanent price increases, whereas 
migrations from other S&P indices, re-entries to the S&P 500 and deletions show 
transitory price effects.  
Microstructural perspectives that are focused on liquidity effects include Erwin 
and Miller (1998) and Hegde and McDermott (2003). Erwin and Miller (1998) find a 
significant decrease in the spreads, associated with enhanced stock liquidity, for additions 
which do not have listed options. However, for optioned stocks, they failed to find a 
significant change in the spreads, potentially attributing the discrepancy to differences in 
informational efficiencies between optioned and non-optioned stocks. Hegde and 
McDermott (2003) present comprehensive research in market microstructural apsects, 
and find that additions show improved liquidity mainly due to lower transacting costs, 
and deletions exhibit deteriorated liquidity.  
Predatory trading that intends to exploit index funds from announcement to 
effective dates has been documented by Beneish and Whaley (1996; 2002). Research that 
examines trading of index funds include Blume and Edelen (2004), Petajisto (2010) and 
Green and Jame (2011). Green and Jame (2011) finds evidence of strategic trading by 
index funds and differentiated price effects depending on the source of liquidity 
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provision. However, their findings those stocks held widely by small- and mid-cap funds 
experience smaller return can also be attributed to investor recognition or information 
effects due to a joint hypothesis problem.  
So far, empirical tests of various hypotheses have been mixed; for example, 
Kappou et al. (2008) do not find support for investor recognition and price pressure, 
while Elliott et al. (2006) claims that investor recognition is a primary factor. Recent 
works using firm characteristics, industry level data or markets other than equities (Kasch 
and Sarkar, 2011; Qi and Sui, 2007; Gygax and Otchere, 2010) increasingly add support 
for the information hypothesis and our finding based on transaction level data is also 
consistent with informational effects.  
2.2. On Information Asymmetry 
Following Huson and MacKinnon (2003) who analyzed the effect of corporate 
spinoffs on information asymmetry, we propose two converse views about whether 
asymmetric information among investors will increase or decrease following the index 
changes.  
First, information asymmetry between investors can decrease for additions and 
increase for deletions. More public information will reduce the value of private 
information, which Hasbrouck (1991) suggests as a key advantage of informed traders. 
Therefore, following index additions (deletions), more (less) public information and 
investor awareness may reduce (increase) inter-investor information asymmetry.  
In contrast, index additions (deletions) can increase (decrease) information 
asymmetry due to an increased activity of informed traders, as the added (deleted) stocks 
10 
 
now have a wider (limited) following, thereby, potentially enlarging the benefits of being 
informed. In addition, superior processing of increased disclosure by informed traders 
can also exacerbate information asymmetry. This line of research where better public 
information complements informed traders’ private information follows the models of 
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) and Lundholm (1991). 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1. S&P 500 Index Constituent Changes 
 
Unlike some indices that mechanically follow predetermined rebalancing rules, 
the S&P 500 index is maintained by the S&P Index Committee, who monitor and 
evaluate the representativeness of the index against the U.S. equities market. Generally, 
index changes are triggered by deletions that are related to mergers and acquisitions of 
the index constituents. Other corporate events such as restructuring, liquidation or 
bankruptcies also initiate deletions. The remaining deletions are caused by a substantial 
violation of one or more of the criteria for index inclusion (S&P Indices, 2011).  
The guidelines for index additions are public information, although the 
identification of candidate firms is not disclosed. According to the S&P index 
methodology, index additions are selected based on the following criteria: U.S. company, 
market capitalization, public float, financial viability, adequate liquidity and reasonable 
11 
 
price, sector representation, and company type. Inevitably, there is a sufficient amount of 
judgement involved in the changes of the S&P 500 components.
8
 
[Insert Table 1] 
We obtain a list of the index changes from 2001 to 2010 from Standard and 
Poor’s, and verify each reason of the changes by manually examining the official public 
release statements. Our sample period is a post-decimalization era and includes market 
structure changes in NYSE after 2005. The initial sample consists of 256 additions and 
256 deletions, as the index changes are concurrent to maintain 500 constituents. To be 
included in our analysis, a firm should not be engaged in contemporaneous corporate 
events. After filtering deletions that are related to mergers and acquisitions, which are the 
most common reasons of index changes, the initial sample consists of 212 additions and 
65 deletions. Following Chen et al. (2004), we include only samples with return data of at 
least 60 trading days prior to the announcement date and 90 trading days after the 
effective date on CRSP and trades and quotes data on TAQ for the same window. We 
also eliminate other confounding events such as bankruptcy, leveraged buyouts, spin-
offs, delisting, relocation to a foreign country, and cosmetic changes such as name 
changes by searching news using Bloomberg Professional. Further, we screen out stocks 
with multiple additions and deletions history.  
Our final sample is 178 additions and 51 deletions, yielding a fairly large sample 
size of deletions than that of most other studies. Previous studies are generally confined 
to additions only, due to data collection difficulties in deletions. Table 1 shows that the 
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 Most studies assume that additions and deletions cannot be predicted in advance. On the contrary, Geppert 
et al. (2010) claims that deletions from the S&P 500 can be predicted. This supports our thesis that 
announcement of deletions are not associated with changes in informational content of trading.  
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annual frequency of the S&P 500 changes is not uniformly distributed, as the years 2008 
and 2009 have higher representations of the changes. Since the years of 2007 and 2008 
correspond to abnormal market environments, we examine the effect of these years using 
dummy variables later in our regression analysis.  
Since 1989, Standard and Poor’s have pre-notified index changes with on average 
5 trading days between the announcement and effective dates. Both announcement and 
index changes take place after the close of trading. We conduct our analysis on a period 
surrounding announcement, as any information effects from announcement should be 
incorporated immediately in an efficient capital market. 
3.2. Trades and Quotes 
 
We extract trades and quotes data of the S&P 500 changes, 90 days prior to the 
announcement dates and 90 days post the effective dates. Following Hegde and 
McDermott (2003) we define our event periods from sixty days prior to announcements 
to sixty days post announcement [-60, +60]. We extract trade and quote data from the 
NYSE TAQ database for the event period.  
Trades data are filtered through the standard criteria
9
 and contemporaneous trades 
are combined using a volume-weighted average price (VWAP).  Similarly, we filter 
quotes data and create NBBO quote per time stamp.
10
 We match trades and quotes using 
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 All trades with a correction indicator other than 0 or 1, conditions A, C, D, N, O, R, or Z, non-positive 
size or price, and trades recorded before opening time (9:30) or after the closing time (16:00) of the market 
are excluded. 
10
 All quotes with non-positive bid size or price, ask size or price, negative bid-ask spreads where offer 
price is less than bid price, quotes for which the quoted spread is greater than 20% of the quote midpoint 
when the quote midpoint is greater than $10, or for which the quoted spread is greater than $2 when the 
quote midpoint is less than $10, and quotes with condition 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 27, 28, 
29 are excluded. 
13 
 
Lee and Ready (1991)’s algorithm – applying a tick test and a quote test – with a one-
second lag, and assign trade direction indicators (buyer-initiated trades =  1, seller-
initiated = -1, other = 0) to all quotes. 
3.3. Decomposition of Spreads 
 
Liquidity effects of the S&P 500 index changes are documented by Hegde and 
McDermott (2003), who use quoted spread, depth, effective spreads, and adverse 
selection cost of trading measures based on the models of Glosten and Harris (1988), 
Foster and Viswanathan (1993), and Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997). In our 
analysis, we use the Hendershott et al. (2011) adaptation of the Glosten and Harris (1988) 
model to estimate the permanent price impact (adverse selection parameter) and the 
transient price impact measures.   
 We measure liquidity and information asymmetry using effective half-spreads, 5-
minute realized spreads, and 5-minute price impacts normalized on the prevailing quote 
midpoint, respectively.  The proportional effective half-spread (       ) is the signed 
difference between the midpoints of the bid and ask quotes and the trade price. 
         
   (         )
   
  
where     is a trade direction indicator from Lee and Ready (1991) for stock   at the time 
 ,      is the trade price, and     is the prevailing quote midpoint. For each stock, we 
measure quoted and effective spreads for each reported transaction and calculate a share-
weighted average across all trades that day.  
14 
 
 We decompose spreads into two parts: the 5-minute realized spread (       ) is 
a proxy for liquidity cost or revenue to liquidity providers under the assumption that the 
dealers can cover their positions at the quote midpoint 5 minutes after the trade. If a quote 
is not available at the exact 5-minute interval, the closest quote post 5 minutes is 
substituted. 
         
   (               )
   
  
where           is the prevailing quote midpoint 5 minutes after the trade at  . The 
adverse selection or losses due to informed liquidity demanders is defined as 
          
   (               )
   
  
Therefore, there exists an identity for the effective spread as the sum of the realized 
spread and the adverse selection. 
                              
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table 2 contains summary statistics on trading variables – number of trades, 
realized spread, adverse selection, effective spread, trade size (= number of shares 
traded), and turnover (= trading volume normalized on shares outstanding). Spread 
variables are winsorized at 99% and 1% to reduce influences by top and bottom outliers. 
Throughout the sample period, trading has substantially grown; the number of trades, 
15 
 
trade size, and turnover are far larger in the sub-period of 2006 to 2010 then in the period 
of 2001-2005.  
In general, additions are more liquid than deletions: mean (median) realized 
spread and adverse selection of additions are 0.0868 (0.0220) and 0.0384 (0.0278) bps, 
while mean (median) realized spread and adverse selection of deletions are 0.1888 
(0.0380) and 0.1513 (0.0656) bps. Further, additions seem to be larger than deletions, 
given the lower mean (median) trade size of additions of 2.8 (1.8) mn shares versus the 
mean (median) trade size of deletions of 5.1 (3.0) mn shares, despite their similar number 
of trades between additions and deletions.  
Between the sub-periods, there seems to be no visible differences in the median 
adverse selection cost for both additions and deletions. However, realized spread, in 
general, has widened in the period of 2006-2010, implying a potential market structural 
change in the recent trading environment.  
[Insert Table 2] 
4.2. Abnormal Returns around Index Changes 
 
Previous studies have thoroughly documented abnormal returns surrounding the 
S&P 500 changes. However, there exists little consensus across them when it comes to 
explaining either the magnitude or the duration of the price effects around the events. For 
instance, Shleifer (1986) and Harris and Gurel (1986) examine similar sample periods 
and reach opposing conclusions on whether the effects are transient or permanent. The 
variations in the results are somewhat inevitable due to variations in selecting event study 
16 
 
parameters. In this study, we only address the direction of the price reactions, without 
concern for whether the effect is temporary or permanent.  
We perform a daily event study based on the Fama-French and the momentum 
factor model using the CRSP equally-weighted index (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 
1997).
11
 The results from the market model are qualitatively similar. To the extent that 
the additional factors (size, market-to-book ratio, and momentum) control for latent price 
effects, our choice of benchmark is more stringent. Our event study parameters are as 
follows: 255 trading days for the estimation period, 15 days between the end of 
estimation period and the start of the event window, and 3 days of minimum non-missing 
returns for estimation. As the composition changes are announced after the market closes, 
we set the announcement day (AD) as the day after the announcement.  
[Insert Table 3] 
The basic abnormal return results, omitted here for brevity, are consistent with 
previous findings; abnormal returns of 2.98% for additions and -4.00% for deletions on 
the announcement day, significant at 1%, that are partially reversed in subsequent days. 
Compared to the data until 2000 from Chen et al. (2004), the magnitudes of the returns 
are smaller in our samples, potentially indicating that the trading pattern has changed. 
From the Table 3, there is no substantial evidence of abnormal price changes prior to the 
announcement date for index changes, as the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in [-
10,-2] and [-5,-2] are not significant at conventional levels. The CAR results suggest that 
the effect of potential information leakages during the specified periods is not significant.  
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 In comparison, Chen et al. (2004) use the S&P 500 index as a benchmark. 
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Table 3 shows that the price gains post additions are more than offset by 
subsequent declines, and vice versa for deletions. After roughly a month and a half post 
announcement (30 trading days post announcement), the performance of stocks included 
into the S&P 500 seem to be worse than the performance of stocks excluded from the 
index. The CAR for additions is -3.44% (generalized sign z-test = -1.82), while the CAR 
for deletion is 1.39% (z = -0.93) thirty trading days post announcement. These results are 
not driven by outliers, as 104 out of 178 added stocks present negative returns and 29 out 
of 51 deleted stocks exhibit positive returns during the window of [-2,+30]. Although the 
30-day cumulative abnormal return for deletions is statistically insignificant, the degree 
of price effects in deletion is more pronounced than that of additions in most of the 
examined event windows.  
While at first glance these results might seem to contradict the assertions of the 
extant literature, we find that it is somewhat consistent with the findings of some of the 
more recent studies such as Zhou (2011). The study finds that pure deletions have a larger 
price increase (11.96%) than the gain by pure additions (7.13%) using samples up to 
2008.
12
 The perverse price reactions between additions and deletions are also documented 
by fund managers. For instance, a 2005 report from Hussman Funds says that “Given 
such dour sentiment for stocks removed from the S&P 500, the group has shown 
surprisingly strong returns, consistently outperforming the shares of companies that have 
been added to the index.”13  
                                                          
12
 For definitions of subgroups such as pure additions and pure deletions, see Zhou (2011): ”Companies 
added to the S&P index family, for the first time” are pure additions, and “companies dropped from the 
S&P index family altogether” are pure deletions. 
13
 See “Misfit Stocks: Deletions from the S&P 500 regularly outperform new additions”, William Hester, 
March 2005 (http://hussman.net/rsi/misfitstocks.htm) 
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A possible explanation for this result may be found in the literature dealing with 
strategic trading. While pseudo-arbitrageurs attempt to front-run index funds (Beneish 
and Whaley, 1996), the index funds themselves spread out their rebalancing over a large 
window in an attempt to avoid large price impact (Green and Jame, 2011). The 
proliferation of algorithmic trading in the market and the availability of high-frequency 
trading platforms would also potentially change the post-2001 results. Other potential 
reasons may include behavioural responses that create undervaluation and, in turn, profit 
opportunities for neglected stocks. 
4.3. Changes in Liquidity and Information Asymmetry around Index Changes 
Chen et. al (2004) argue that the price effect around addition is persistent, while 
the effect around deletion is transient. Building on their results, we conjecture that the 
observed abnormal returns are potentially related to the activities of informed traders in 
the market. An increase in disclosure of information around addition can possibly lead to 
a higher level of informed trading, or, on the contrary, it can reduce the information 
asymmetry due to a diminished informational advantage by informed traders, as more 
private information becomes public.  
Similarly, the deletion event leads to a reduced number of analysts following the 
firm (Zhou, 2011), potentially changing the informational environment. In one end, the 
adverse selection cost might rise due to increased firm-to-investor information 
asymmetry, on the other end, the adverse selection cost might decline, as the diminished 
release of information can potentially make relatively a large fraction of investors equally 
uninformed and, therefore, no informational distinction among them. Hegde and 
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McDermott (2003) present some evidence that the adverse selection post addition 
declines. However, the deletion result is still an empirical issue. 
Table 4 reports that quoted spreads and relative spreads decrease (increase) over 
the three months following addition (deletion). Hence, there is evidence of a significant 
long-term improvement in liquidity post addition and significant long-term deterioration 
in liquidity post deletion.  
We find a significant drop in adverse selection post addition and an increase in the 
realized spread. This is as suggested by theoretical market microstructural models, which 
predicts that liquidity supply and informed order flow are inversely related. The realized 
spread, which is a measure of the non-permanent price impact of trade, captures the 
liquidity provider’s revenue after loss to informed traders. In the presence of informed 
order flow, liquidity supplier increases the spread in order to recoup the losses that may 
occur when trading against better-informed traders, leading to a negative relation between 
realized spread and adverse selection.  
For our sample, the changes in effective spreads following addition are 
statistically zero. This implies that increased firm transparency (Platikanova, 2008) post 
addition, in turn, may lead to lower risk of adverse selection in the trading environment. 
However, a large portion of the benefits from this change seem to be exploited by 
liquidity suppliers, resulting in effective spreads remaining unchanged. This result is 
somewhat surprising, since we expect that the instrument of post-addition improved 
liquidity to be competition among liquidity providers.    
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Conversely, we find that the adverse selection cost of trading significantly 
increases over the three months post deletion. One possible reason for this change is 
perhaps the exit of index funds that, in turn, reduces non-informational trading. It can 
also be potentially related to a decline in the number of analysts covering the firm (Zhou, 
2011) that leads to a lower amount of firm-specific information (thereby increased firm-
to-investor information asymmetry). 
Surprisingly, the realized spreads post deletion appear to decline significantly, 
resulting in narrower effective spreads, inconsistent with the increase in quoted and 
relative spreads. Quoted spreads are the difference between the bid and ask quotes and 
measure market and order flow conditions at the time of order arrival, whereas effective 
spreads consider trades that are executed inside the quotes, therefore, more reliably 
measuring the true cost of trading. One possible explanation for the lower effective 
spreads is a greater level of competition among liquidity suppliers. Given the increase in 
asymmetric information post deletion, it might also be explained by the models that 
present an inverse relation between liquidity supply and informed order flow. 
4.4. Regressions of Event Returns on Changes in Liquidity and Information Asymmetry  
The results so far have been univariate. In this section, we further analyse the 
association between the changes in adverse selection risks and realized spreads around 
index changes and the corresponding CAR around the events. We control for the effects 
from some of the previously documented associations, such as arbitrage risk (ArbRisk) 
and shadow costs (dShadow). If the index changes were a mainly liquidity driven event, 
we expect to see a significant relation between the non-permanent price impact parameter 
(realized spread) and the CAR, but a non-significant association between changes in the 
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permanent price impact measure (adverse selection). Otherwise, the index changes may 
convey informational effect, and, therefore, a permanent effect. An adverse selection cost 
of trading is a measure of illiquidity. Therefore, changes in information asymmetry 
should be positively related to returns. Signs of realized spread variable remain an 
empirical issue.   
We decompose the effective spread (ESPRD) into the realized spread (RSPRD) 
and the adverse selection (ADVSEL), which represents transitory price impact or revenue 
that compensates liquidity providers and permanent price impact or informational loss of 
liquidity provider due to informed trading, respectively. Following Hendershott et al. 
(2011), RSPRD proxies for liquidity effect and ADVSEL proxies for information 
asymmetry. Our basic analytical framework is: 
                              
                                   
                             
In specifying the regressions, we follow Chen et al. (2004), which examine the 
relation between abnormal returns and changes in Merton’s shadow cost. As in 
McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2008), which measure changes in insider ownership on 
changes in firm value, the method of using changes is preferred to using the level of each 
variable by enabling to circumvent potential endogeneity between the level of liquidity, 
information asymmetry and returns.  
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We measure changes in liquidity and information asymmetry by the mean 
differences between windows of [-60, -10] and [+10, +60] in RSPRD, ADVSEL, and 
shadow cost variables. These methods are adopted from Hegde and McDermott (2003), 
and Chen et al. (2004). By dropping the immediate event intervals, we intend to avoid 
potential contamination effects from the index changes. Using the mean differences 
without omitting the intervals yields qualitatively similar results with a stronger 
significance.  
Further, we control for the arbitrage risk effect (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002) 
and the investor recognition effect (Chen et al., 2004). In previous studies, arbitrage risk 
and investor recognition are found to have generally significant influences on abnormal 
returns (Elliott et al., 2006; Green and Jame, 2011), while other control factors such as 
size, age, NYSE/Nasdaq dummies, and changes in analysts’ forecasts are not consistently 
significant in multivariate testing (Elliott et al., 2006). Our expanded model including 
control variable are: 
                                                 
We proxy for arbitrage risk by residual standard deviation and investor 
recognition by Merton’s shadow cost, respectively. We construct a variable that measures 
arbitrage risk in the spirit of Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), which propose that high-
arbitrage-risk stocks have steeper demand curves than low-arbitrage-risk stocks, and, 
therefore, a positive sign of the ArbRisk coefficient. Arbitrage risk is measured as the 
variance of the residuals of the Fama-French and the momentum factor model, 
              (       )                        
23 
 
where     is the return on the CRSP equally-weighted index,     is the one-month 
Treasury Bill rates,     is the small-minus-big return,     is the high-minus-low 
return,  and     is the Carhart momentum factor.14 The parameters are estimated over a 
[-365, -20] trading day window. In Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), two arbitrage-risk 
measures, A1 and A2, are suggested: A1 is the variance of the residuals of the excess 
return market model regression estimated over a [-365, -20] day window. A2 is the 
residual variance of the excess returns on three industry-, size-, and book-to-market-
matched close substitute stocks. We only examine A1 in our analysis, since A1 and A2 
have a correlation of 0.98 (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002), and our abnormal returns 
are based on the four-factor model that separately incorporates size and book-to-market 
ratio effects.  
We proxy for investor awareness (recognition) using Merton’s shadow cost. 
Merton (1987) suggested that investors only trade in the stocks of which they aware, 
thereby holding incompletely diversified portfolios. The difference between the higher 
returns for less than fully diversified investors than that for completely diversified 
investors is Merton’s shadow cost. 
Following Kadlec and McConnell (1994) and Chen et al. (2004), we define 
shadow cost as: 
            
               
                 
 
         
                  
, 
                                                          
14
 Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) use a market model residual with the CRSP value-weighted index. We 
modify the benchmark to be consistent with our abnormal return measures. We verify that the correlations 
among the market model residual, the Fama-French three-factor model residual, and the four-factor model 
are above 0.99, justifying the use of the multi-factor model residual. 
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where residual standard deviation is measured as the standard deviation of the difference 
between the firm’s return and the S&P 500 return in the 252-day period before the 
announcement date and in the 252-day period after the effective date. Firm size, 
measured by the market value of the firm’s equity, and the S&P 500 market capitalization 
are calculated on the announcement date. The number of shareholders for the pre-event 
period is measured as close as possible prior to the announcement date, and the number 
of shareholders for the post-event period is as close as possible after the effective date. 
Price and number of shares outstanding are from CRSP and the number of shareholders is 
from Compustat.  
 Prior to regressions, we examine correlations among variables. Trade variables – 
trading volume, size, number of trades – are correlated at a higher level to each other, but 
our key variables of interests such as RSPRD, ADVSEL, ArbRisk, and shadow costs are 
not seriously correlated. Among the key variables, ADVSEL and ArbRisk are most 
highly correlated at 0.1539. This result intuitively makes sense, as stocks with higher 
idiosyncratic risk are likely to be more obscure and should have higher presence of 
information asymmetry that rewards informed trading. 
The regression results are reported in Table 6. All our results are based on 
heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors. Multicollinearities are not a big 
concern to affect the stability and size of the standard errors, as the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs, unreported) are less than 2 for additions and less than 4 for deletions. The 
elevated VIFs for the spreads in deletions suggest a potential collinearity is a bigger issue 
in deletions, while they remain below the conventionally regarded as a critical level of 
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10. The univariate results with spreads-only tests are analogous to the multivariate 
results; hence, we primarily discuss the multivariate results.  
[Insert Table 6] 
A. Additions 
 
The intercepts (Table 6) of additions shows significance throughout -10 days to 
+10 days of the window, implying that the cumulative abnormal returns are statistically 
significant, similar to the event study results reported in Section 4.1. We find that 
changes in adverse selection (dADVSEL) are influential during the [-2,+1], [-2,+5], and 
[-2,+10] windows in explaining the abnormal returns (t-statistics = 1.69, 2.25, and 3.02). 
The relation suggests that the increasing inter-investor information asymmetry during 
these periods is positively correlated to the cumulative abnormal returns. The result of the 
[-2,+1] window captures an immediate price reaction, while those of [-2,+5] and [-2,+10] 
correspond to the price responses up to the effective dates and including a period when 
index funds are expected to strategically adjust their positions (Green and Jame, 2011). 
The result presents an evidence of informed trading that is significantly associated with 
the price reactions immediately around the S&P 500 index additions. 
The results of ArbRisk and dShadow are inconsistent with the limited arbitrage 
risk and investor recognition hypotheses. According to the arbitrage risk hypotheses, 
stocks with high idiosyncratic risk should experience larger abnormal returns on 
inclusion into the S&P 500 index. Although ArbRisk exhibit a significance at 10% for 
CAR[-5,-2] and CAR[-2,+30], the negative signs for additions contradicts the 
expectations that stocks with larger arbitrage risk should associate with larger price 
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changes. We may consider the following reconciliations: First, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 
(2002) use additions between 1976 and 1989, before the preannouncement of index 
changes. Although this setting may be regarded as a clean test that can remove 
confounding effects from potential front running of investors other than index funds, the 
sample period is undeniably outdated. The trading environment has changed significantly 
since then. Similarly, dShadow is inconsistent with the investor recognition hypothesis: 
Although the lower shadow cost suggests improved investor awareness that results in 
higher abnormal returns, the signs change after CAR[-2,+5] and their statistical 
significance are very small. We omit the CAR[-2,+30] and CAR[-2,+60] results for 




 The regression results of deletions are distinct from those of additions. There are 
evidences that improved liquidity (= negative dRSPRD) is an important factor to the 
abnormal returns (t-statistics of CAR[-2,+1] = -2.77) at 1% level, however, the effect is 
short-lived. Unlike additions, we do not find evidence that changes in adverse selection is 
associated with the event returns. Arbitrage risk and shadow cost are also insignificant in 
general and their signs are not as the same expected by extant hypotheses.  
Our results suggest that information asymmetry has a significant association with 
CAR for additions, but not for deletions. Although the realized spreads are negatively 
related, the coefficients are not significant for any of the event windows. This 
discrepancy to the Hegde and McDermott (2003) results may be at least partly attributed 
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to the differences in the sample periods. We conjecture that informational effects from 
announcement of deletions are limited, since investors who are familiar with the S&P 500 
index may already have incorporated any fundamental information into the prices. These 
results suggest that trading around the announcement of deletions is influenced by latent 
variables other than the spreads, arbitrage risk, and shadow cost. However, an elaboration 
of the determinants of deletion returns should be left for future study. 
4.4. Robustness Tests 
 
 In this section, we report the robustness test results. First, we conduct analysis 
using the adverse selection measure by Glosten and Harris (1988, hereafter GH). The GH 
model defines the adverse selection, and the direct cost of transacting such as the 
inventory holding, and the order-processing components as a linear function of 
transaction volume: 
                               
 where    is a transaction price,     is a trade direction indicator of 1 (buyer-
initiated trades), and -1 (seller-initiated trades), following the Lee and Ready (1991) 
procedure,    is a trading volume at a time  . The information asymmetry component is 
measured as percentage of the bid-ask spread: 
   
 (      ̅)
 (      ̅)   (      ̅)
     
 where  ̅ is the average transaction volume,  (      ̅) is the adverse selection 
component, and  (      ̅) is the transitory component of the bid-ask spread.  
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[Insert Table 7] 
 Using GH as a measure of information asymmetry, we find that information 
asymmetry slightly increases in the index changes during the window of [-2,+1] (t-
statistics = 1.70 for additions and 1.76 for deletions, respectively). However, in the 
windows of [-2,+5] and [-2,+10], the GH measures do not show a clear pattern. Given 
that the GH measure is calculated on an annual basis, the power of the measure may be 
weaker.   
Additionally, we test the changes in trading volume normalized by outstanding 
shares (dVol), and the effect of the financial crisis (yDum as 1 if the year is 2007 or 2008, 
and 0 otherwise). Both covariates do not appear significant in explaining the cumulative 
abnormal returns around index changes, and our conclusions from Section 4.3 remain 
intact. Hence, the general pattern of adverse selection and liquidity remain the same after 
controlling for trading volume and the year-effect.  
5. Conclusion 
 
This study examines asymmetric information between investors around S&P 500 
revisions using a recent sample from 2001 to 2010. We find that a significant sustained 
improvement in liquidity, as measured by quoted spreads and relative spreads, post 
addition and the converse relation post deletion. We find evidence of a decrease in inter-
investor asymmetry post addition, potentially led by an improved dissemination of 
information from a firm to the market. This result is consistent with the theoretical 
predictions by Diamond (1985) and Hakansson (1977). Furthermore, the decline in the 
29 
 
adverse selection cost over the subsequent three months is significantly positively 
associated with the event period returns of additions, exhibiting the price formation 
process around additions. In contrast, we do not find evidence that changes in inter-
investor asymmetric information are related to event window returns of deletions. This 
asymmetric result may be broadly consistent with the findings by Chen et al. (2004) who 
find asymmetric price behaviors and investor recognition between additions and 
deletions. 
This study helps better understand the dynamics of two types of information 
asymmetry – one from a firm to investor, and the other between investors, presents 
evidence of the role of adverse selection in index changes, and extends the previous 
results from market microstructural aspects (Hegde and McDermott, 2003) with an 
alternative measure of liquidity and adverse selection cost.   
For future research, we first recognize that much has been changed in the era of 
algorithmic trading. Our evidence indicates that price effects around S&P 500 index 
changes in the recent period, which is coincident to the prevalence of algorithmic trading, 
are dissimilar to the findings from prior literature. Therefore, a study of index changes 
that are associated with algorithmic trading will be useful to gain an understanding of 
modern trading environment. Another potential research topic from our study is an 
examination of how liquidity and information asymmetry changes in the predatory 
trading context. Although index changes do not yield distressed trading per se, fore-
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Table 1 Sample Construction of S&P 500 Index Changes from 2001 to 2010 
 
This table describes a list of changes to the S&P 500 index from 2001 to 2010, after removing 
confounding events such as mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcies, and other corporate 
restructuring, as well as multiple inclusions of and exclusions from the index. Two additions 
whose effective dates occurred in January 2001 are included to additions in 2001. 
 
 
  Initial samples Final samples % proportion of 
Year additions deletions additions deletions changes 
2001 31 31 20 5 11.2 9.8 
2002 24 24 13 5 7.3 9.8 
2003 10 10 7 0 3.9 0.0 
2004 20 20 11 6 6.2 11.8 
2005 20 20 12 2 6.7 3.9 
2006 31 31 24 6 13.5 11.8 
2007 40 40 29 3 16.3 5.9 
2008 34 34 30 10 16.9 19.6 
2009 29 29 18 12 10.1 23.5 
2010 17 17 14 2 7.9 3.9 






Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Trading Environment around S&P 500 Changes 
 
This table summarizes the trading environment of the S&P 500 index changes from 2001 to 2010.  
The statistics are estimated over -60 to +60 event window (with 0 being the announcement day). 
Number of trades is the number of trades; price is the actual trade price per share; RSPRD is the 
5-minute realized spread; ADVSEL is the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask 
spread; ESPRD is the effective spread following Hendershott et al. (2011); trade size is the 
number of shares traded; turnover is the trade volume normalized by outstanding shares. 
 
 
  A. Additions (N = 21625) B. Deletions (N = 7276) 
2001-2010 Mean Std Dev Median Mean Std Dev Median 
Number of trades 4,339.95 3,557.86 3,472.00 4,574.25 4,052.20 3,567.50 
Price 59.74 73.20 43.80 18.68 16.06 16.63 
RSPRD (× 10
2
) 0.0868 0.2018 0.0220 0.1888 0.5455 0.0380 
ADVSEL (× 10
2
) 0.0384 0.0522 0.0278 0.1513 0.6640 0.0656 
ESPRD (× 10
2
) 0.1275 0.2277 0.0533 0.3464 1.0209 0.1180 
Trade size 2,884,957 3,683,217 1,750,569 5,063,367 7,875,360 2,953,950 
Turnover 16.32 22.55 10.27 22.54 27.46 15.49 
2001 - 2005 A. Additions (N = 7978) B. Deletions (N = 2285) 
Number of trades 2,489.47 2,843.30 1,527.00 1,220.79 1,220.74 913.00 
Price 42.49 17.50 39.22 19.73 11.19 19.25 
RSPRD (× 10
2
) 0.0396 0.0966 0.0196 0.1155 0.5215 0.0238 
ADVSEL (× 10
2
) 0.0399 0.0451 0.0294 0.2481 1.1418 0.0658 
ESPRD (× 10
2
) 0.0816 0.1188 0.0552 0.3676 1.5863 0.0967 
Trade size 2,382,773 3,958,412 1,204,650 2,539,352 8,177,827 432,500 
Turnover 11.88 19.38 6.58 11.50 19.67 6.14 
2006 - 2010 A. Additions (N = 13647) B. Deletions (N = 4991) 
Number of trades 5,421.73 3,487.23 4,588.00 6,109.55 3,968.64 5,137.00 
Price 69.83 89.64 46.09 18.20 17.83 12.73 
RSPRD (× 10
2
) 0.1144 0.2388 0.0241 0.2223 0.5529 0.0514 
ADVSEL (× 10
2
) 0.0376 0.0559 0.0268 0.1070 0.1997 0.0656 
ESPRD (× 10
2
) 0.1543 0.2683 0.0515 0.3367 0.6062 0.1420 
Trade size 3,178,533 3,479,101 2,157,632 6,218,921 7,453,756 4,411,136 






Table 3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns around S&P 500 Changes  
 
Abnormal returns are measured compared to the Fama-French-Momentum factor model using the 
CRSP equally-weighted index as a benchmark. The event study parameters are as follows: 255 
trading days for the estimation period, 15 days between the end of estimation period and the start 
of the event window, and 3 days of minimum non-missing returns for estimation. As the 
composition changes are announced after the market closes, the day after the announcement is set 
as the announcement day (AD). Mean abnormal returns are in percent. Positive: Negative 






 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using a one-tail test. 
The significance of the proportions similarly corresponds to the significance using the generalized 
sign test. 
 
  A. Additions (N = 178) B. Deletions (N = 51) 
Days relative 































































Table 4 Comparison of Trading Variables between Pre- and Post-Index Changes 
 
This table presents changes in the spreads, trading volume, and prices around index changes. The 
changes in the variables are measured over -60 to -1 and +1 to +60 trading days, and over -60 to -
10 and +10 to +60 trading days. Day zero represents the announcement day. RSPRD, ADVSEL, 
and ESPRD are relative spread, adverse selection, and effective spread, respectively. QSPRD is 
quoted spread, or the difference between the bid and ask quotes. RelSPRD is the relative spread, 
or QSPRD divided by the price. nVol is the trading volume, nTrades is the number of trades, 







statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: [-60, -1] vs. [+1, +60]  
  A. Additions  B. Deletions 














































Panel B: [-60, -10] vs. [+10, +60]  
  A. Additions  B. Deletions 


















































Table 5 Correlations among Variables 
 
 
This table describes the Pearson correlation coefficients among the independent variables under the null hypothesis of no correlation, measured 
cross-sectionally and across years from 2001 to 2010, around the S&P 500 index changes. nTrades is the number of trades; price is the actual trade 
price per share; RSPRD is the 5-minute realized spread; ADVSEL is the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread; ESPRD is the 
effective spread from Hendershott and (2011); size is the number of shares traded; nVol is the trade volume normalized by outstanding shares; 
Arbitrage risk is measured as the variance of the residuals of the Fama-French and the momentum factor model. Shadow cost is defined as 
(Residual Standard Deviation)/(S&P 500 Market Capitalization) × (Firm Size)/(Number of Shareholders).   
 
  nTrades PRICE RSPRD ADVSEL ESPRD SIZE nVol ArbRisk preShadow 
nTrades                   
Price 0.0714         
RSPRD 0.2238 -0.0686        
ADVSEL 0.0067 -0.0738 0.3004       
ESPRD 0.1521 -0.0883 0.8230 0.7774      
Size 0.6732 -0.0822 0.2697 0.2114 0.3026     
nVol 0.5151 0.0377 0.2150 0.1074 0.2078 0.6458    
ArbRisk 0.0499 -0.0935 0.0269 0.1539 0.1066 0.2321 0.1746   
preShadow 0.0988 0.1506 0.0018 -0.0163 -0.0087 0.0239 0.1140 0.1776  






Table 6 Effects of Liquidity, Information Asymmetry, Arbitrage Risk and Investor Recognition around Index Changes  
 
The table contains univariate and multivariate tests of the S&P 500 index changes, using the model CAR = α + β1 dRSPRD+ β2 dADVSEL+ β3 
Arb Risk + β4 dShadow + ϵ, where dRSPRD = PostRSPRD – PreRSPRD, and dADVSEL and dShadow are analogously defined. Changes in 
liquidity, information asymmetry, and investor recognition are measured by the mean differences between windows of [-60, -10] and [+10, +60] in 
RSPRD, ADVSEL, shadow cost variables. RSPRD is the 5-minute realized spread, and ADVSEL is the information asymmetry component of the 
bid-ask spread from Hendershott and (2011); Arbitrage risk is measured as the variance of the residuals of the Fama-French and the momentum 
factor model. Shadow cost is defined as (Residual Standard Deviation)/(S&P 500 Market Capitalization) × (Firm Size)/(Number of Shareholders).  
All results are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors. Chen et al. (2004) report dShadow, deflating at 10
-9
. The values in 






 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  Panel A: Additions 















 -0.013 0.004 
 
(0.41) (1.85) (-0.23) (2.01) (7.83) (6.38) (4.79) (4.54) (1.63) (1.74) (-1.66) (0.32) 
dRSPRD -7.629 -9.249 -3.271 -4.869 -1.469 -1.813 -1.397 -1.756 -5.402 -5.639 -9.938 -11.510 
 
(-1.30) (-1.47) (-0.79) (-1.17) (-0.38) (-0.45) (-0.29) (-0.36) (-1.03) (-1.06) (-1.15) (-1.27) 
dADVSEL 61.625 69.878
*












 33.210 37.503 
 





















































R-square 0.020 0.0798 0.004 0.134 0.030 0.038 0.036 0.040 0.054 0.056 0.008 0.041 





Panel B: Deletions 

















 -0.019 -0.018 0.018 0.009 
 









 -7.024 -4.489 11.587 13.524 5.076 6.067 
 
(-3.22) (-3.07) (-1.01) (-0.92) (-2.68) (-2.77) (-0.35) (-0.23) (0.63) (0.76) (0.24) (0.29) 
dADVSEL 3.720 0.384 0.340 -1.785 6.097 5.723 -2.538 -3.932 -5.996 -5.878 -4.952 -6.247 
 























































R-square 0.337 0.389 0.091 0.110 0.125 0.126 0.072 0.116 0.010 0.035 0.007 0.009 






Table 7 Robustness Tests 
 
This table contains robustness tests of the S&P 500 index changes, using the model from Table 6 as a base. GH for information asymmetry is 
measured following Glosten and Harris (1988). dVol is the change from pre-event normalized trading volume to post-event normalized trading 







 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Additions 






































































 ArbRisk -7.601 -2.924 -6.610 -7.248 -3.518 -5.621 -7.012 -4.060 -6.393 
 
(-0.99) (-0.37) (-0.85) (-0.82) (-0.36) (-0.62) (-0.66) (-0.35) (-0.59) 
dShadow 0.282 37.919 -1.052 -4.861 17.124 -7.050 53.998 69.334 53.167 
 





























R-square 0.038 0.030 0.040 0.051 0.012 0.055 0.083 0.005 0.083 






Panel B: Deletions                   






























































 ArbRisk 4.508 -4.322 -4.212 6.275 -13.781 3.711 -11.653 -20.111 3.263 
 
(0.23) (-0.14) (-0.37) (0.41) (-0.53) (0.28) (-0.35) (-0.62) (0.13) 

































R-square 0.127 0.042 0.160 0.116 0.073 0.119 0.035 0.027 0.089 
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
 
